Adrian Pritchett

Albert Borgmann follows the general project by Heidegger to see how technology has harmful effects on humanity and to determine how it can be reformed. Borgmann shares Heidegger’s view that modern technology is starkly different from premodern technology in its pattern of disclosing the world to human beings. Borgmann agrees that a sort of ethical reform must be undertaken to limit technological ways of living from dominating the lives of individuals and to keep technology in its place. His proposal for a direction of reform first takes cues from Heidegger but then asserts the need for different tactics.

First, we look at Borgmann’s chapter "Focal Things and Practices." Here he names the things that matter in directing human lives "focal." Focal things contribute to the direction and ordering of one’s life in a productive way, and they disclose the world and illuminate the context of themselves and their related life activities. He actually uses a lot of verbs to convey the sense of focus with which he is concerned, so no one terse definition is given.

Borgmann agrees with Heidegger that the simple kinds of things are those that focus a gathering of information about the world and benefit human beings by highlighting important life concerns, though he thinks that Heidegger sees the use of these things as too much an escape from technology rather than an affirmation of it. These simple, focal things are premodern objects, such as Heidegger’s example of an earthen jug, or even activities. The jug gathers and discloses the world because it is made of the earth and is used to store wine from grapes that grow in the earth; furthermore, the jug is used in the human context of tradition, ritual, and sustenance.

Modern technology is a distracting complication to the things that matter. It separates the enjoyment of means from their ends and presents its goods or activities as mere commodities that the serve the human body or its immediate desires. This is why advanced technological objects or activities do not currently serve as focal things. Technology also tires people with intense labor division that isolates them from the world. The simple things that are focal actually unite ends and means as well as relate their users to the world in a deep way that commodities cannot.

Focal things are located in a dichotomy of complexity, however. They themselves are simple, but the focal practices in which they are situated are quite complex. The focal practice is the crucial human element, not the focal thing in itself. Focal practices develop from tradition and they invoke the development of discipline and skill. These practices challenge the human capacities for intellect, strength, and craft. The outstanding feature of focal practices is sheer engagement — engagement with the earth, human society, and one’s own self. It is through this realm of action that individuals become intimate with the world and form bonds with their fellow human beings.

In the times before modern technology, focal practices occupied a proper center in daily life. They were usually religious and mythic in nature. Their settings were public and elaborate. Modern technology has scattered focal practices to the periphery of our daily concerns. They are now found in small, humble settings where they have to be sought amidst busy lifestyles.

Borgmann presents two types of focal practices and expounds the manner in which they demonstrate the foregoing assertions. One practice is the culture of serving a family dinner (the "great meal"), and the other is the sport of running. For each practice he contrasts their benefits with their parallel sorts of products obtained from technological means. A great meal is contrasted with fast food and snacking, and running is contrasted against driving a car or running on a treadmill.

Serving a family dinner is a complex and ritualistic practice. The world is disclosed through handling and preparing products of the earth. Human society is strengthened by following cooking traditions and gathering family members and friends together to share the meal. Knowledge and skill are employed by cooking and serving. The discipline and ritual centers the lives of those who participate. In contrast, a fast food sandwich compacts the ingredients into a convenient unit, and it is made as a commodity without focal concerns in mind by an anonymous worker. Snacking serves as mere sustenance for people as they go about their busy and tired lives without meaningful personal interaction.

Running is a practice with a simple object but complex concerns. It challenges human commitment and endurance. Mind and body are united in this effort, and human greatness is found by exploring our limits. Running involves a physical intimacy with the world and a human connection when onlookers cheer on the runners. In contrast, running on a treadmill usually involves a distracted mind and no intimacy with the world. Also, driving is a clear example of dividing ends from means because the efforts to purchase the car and its fuel are not related to the result of achieving transportation. Driving also does not seriously challenge human skill and limits, and it seems to insulate the driver from the world.

Borgmann elucidates the nature of engagement in practices that are not related to advanced technology, and he makes a strong point that the practice of engagement is required to challenge the harmful pattern of technological living that has concerned Heidegger. However, the important result of this chapter is that engagement must be directed upon focal things. A focal practice is not mere engagement but engagement with a thing and practice involving activity that can be identified as properly focal, which means such engagement will center and order the participants’ lives as described above.

Now we look briefly at Borgmann’s following chapter, "Wealth and the Good Life," to understand how focal things and practices fit into his proposal to reform technology. Wealth pertains to the human good, and the good life pertains to practicing excellence with focal concerns in mind. It is not within our current scope to consider this chapter’s response to other ethicists or discussion on special questions of focal practices, but the importance is how it outlines the concerns of his proposal and clears misunderstandings about focal practices.

Borgmann refines his concept of focal practices and emphasizes their low technological nature by contrasting another focal practice with advanced technological engagement. He claims that fly-fishing is a focal practice whereas computer design is not. Fly-fishing requires a lot of skill, practice, and planning, and the practice connects the practitioner to the world through the focal thing, the trout. He claims that computer design is not focal despite its thoroughly engaging nature. The engagement is disembodied mental work, and the computer as its object is a technological device that does not gather and disclose the world. The computer is a mere means to an arbitrary end chosen by consumers, not a unity of means and ends. Finally, it has become clear why Borgmann rails against technology for its inability to provide proper focus: it does not unite humans with the natural world in which they live.

So we are prepared to understand the structure of Borgmann’s reform proposal. Technological thinking and living must not dominate our lives. We must seek out focal things and engage them in practices. Practices constitute regular activity that shape our habits and attitudes, which is to say that we engage in excellence when we focus on the things that matter. Focusing on the things that matter preserves the unities between means with ends and humans with the world, so reform will not occur within technology’s pattern that Borgmann calls the device paradigm, a system that produces commodities to fulfill needs. Reform will clear a central place outside of technology to allow focal concerns, so the result will be the intelligent, selective limitation of technology. Humans will flourish as they are then able to practice excellence and strengthen family relations.

Borgmann’s view of technology and reform proposal have become clear, but this selection of his writing begins with descriptions that are too vague and proceeds rather indirectly. It is also problematic that his claims against technology being focal are easily challenged since they are not fully argued.

The problem of vagueness surrounds the whole notion of focal things and practices. A smorgasbord of verbs is used to describe what focal things and practices actually do. Borgmann takes a lot of space to explicate the profundity and meaning of his example practices, but this can be construed as a lengthy emotional appeal to convince us that simple pleasures without convenience or gadgetry can be very moving. The reader is left without a way to concisely explain what "focal" means.

If the subject matter is vague, backtracking is needed to clarify it. After all the description of focal practices in the first chapter, Borgmann does not explain a crucial reason that advanced technology has not given us focal things: technology does not gather and disclose the world. This feature of focal things was named at the start, but its status in technological things was confusingly omitted in explicit form until the second chapter, after much discussion of examples and other argumentation. This allows his argument for engagement in practice to become quite misleading. It appears in the first chapter that Borgmann is arguing that the engagement from focal practices is what makes them focal and establishes the important unities of focal concerns. He shows that the consumption of commodities is not engaging whereas engagement is found in the cultural practices subverted by advanced technology. However, it is only later that he acknowledges the robust engagement possible with technology, and we finally see that he was not just looking for a particular depth of engagement but at the elements that are engaged. Yes, engagement is necessary, but a full relationship of engagement with the world is needed.

Unfortunately, Borgmann has not made a case for how technology does not gather and disclose the world. It is not at all clear that focal things must be simple, natural, and old-fashioned. He provides the computer design example as a demonstration of this claim, but the claim is not argued in this selection. The claim is softened a bit by his statement that technology does not fail this way in principle but only that the current state of technology there has not been a focal thing produced by technology. (Indeed, this qualification may be essential to leave room for a type of reform that will accommodate technology: once the pattern of technological dominance is tempered, advanced technology may then be capable of producing focal things as guided by a new, healthy pattern.) Of course, we also lack an understanding of where Borgmann has placed the line between what he calls the technological and the pre-technological, categories I have here more appropriately called advanced technology and pre-modern technology.

It remains contentious that engagement with advanced technology does not address focal concerns. Borgmann’s computer design example can be challenged by the claims that computer scientists do account for both the means and ends of their products, or that computers do connect designer to the world by virtue of their applications and human benefits kept in mind. Likewise, focal practices could be likened to technological activities that produce mere commodities; the important features of engagement and connection in focal practices could be identified with peripheral activities not directly related to the focal things. Borgmann even admits that focal practices have the danger of becoming deadening chores, which suggests to me that he may have missed the mark in identifying his concerns with pre-modern technology.

This does not mean that Borgmann’s reform proposal is defective. From this selection we can glean reasons to follow it. Many readers would agree that the current state of technology has contributed to social ills, and they would further agree that orderly devotion to focal concerns is beneficial and that technological activity should be restricted to protect them. If we want to champion Borgmann’s proposal, we must dispense with his technological division that locates the source of focal practices in pre-modern types of things that are only enhanced by technology in the periphery. We must reformulate what focal things and practices are without being misguided by the level of a thing’s technological complexity. It seems that if focal practices engage certain elements but technology does not in principle exclude those elements, both of which Borgmann agrees, then it is not necessary to maintain Borgmann’s criticism of modern technological things. His concern is the pattern in which technology is currently engaged, and he has not at all made it clear how the troublesome disunities and commodities are necessarily related to the products of modern technology. We need to find the essential features of focal concerns and apply them to a reform proposal without Borgmann’s intermediate complications.